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A B S T R A C T
In a world in which economic losses due to natural disasters are set to increase, it is essential to study risk
reduction strategies, including individual homeowner investments in damage-reducing (mitigation) measures. In
this lab experiment (N = 357), we investigated the effects of different financial incentives, probability levels,
and deductibles on self-insurance investments in a natural disaster insurance market with compulsory coverage.
In particular, we examined how these investments are jointly influenced by financial incentives, such as in-
surance, premium discounts, and mitigation loans. We also studied the influence of behavioral characteristics,
including individual time and risk preferences. We found that investments increase when the expected value of
the damage increases (i.e., higher deductibles, higher probabilities). Moral hazard is found in the high-prob-
ability (15%) scenarios, but not in the low-probability (3%) scenarios. This suggests that moral hazard is less of
an issue in an insurance market where probabilities are low. Our results demonstrate that a premium discount
can increase investment in damage-reduction, as can a policyholder‘s risk aversion, perceived efficacy of pro-
tective measures, and worry about flooding.
1. Introduction
Economic losses due to low-probability/high-impact natural dis-
aster events, such as floods, have increased in the past 25 years and this
trend is likely to continue (IPCC, 2012; Munich RE, 2018). Insurance
arrangements can be useful tools for limiting the costs of natural dis-
asters by spreading risk intertemporally and geographically over a large
group of policyholders1 and for providing financial compensation after
a disaster to facilitate recovery. Despite growing interest in insurance as
a tool in disaster risk management, the design of such insurance ar-
rangements is heavily debated among governments, which tend to focus
on affordability and coverage, and the insurance industry, which tends
to focus on risk-based pricing and risk reduction (Hudson, Botzen,
Feyen, & Aerts, 2016).
Different options exist for policyholders to reduce risk, including
self-insurance (reducing the damage in case of a loss) and self-protec-
tion (reducing the probability of a loss occurring). The interplay of
insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection has been extensively stu-
died, starting with an influential theoretical paper by Ehrlich and
Becker (1972). Their model shows that market insurance and self-
insurance are substitutes, whereas self-protection can be com-
plementary to market insurance. Over the years, many experiments
tested the normative predictions of insurance demand (see, e.g.,
Jaspersen, 2016, for a comprehensive review). While most of these
papers investigate empirical regularities related to insurance demand,
few focus on the interaction with risk reduction activities. This paper
relates to the empirical literature on self-insurance and self-protection,
with a focus on the relevant dimensions of heterogeneity of self-in-
surance under compulsory insurance coverage for low-probability/
high-impact risk. From an expected utility theory perspective, self-in-
surance investments should increase when the probability of a loss in-
creases and when the insurance coverage decreases through a higher
deductible. Investments in self-insurance should decrease in the pre-
sence of insurance due to moral hazard (Winter, 2013). Insurance ar-
rangements could be further combined with explicit financial incentives
to stimulate policyholders to install damage-reduction measures, such
as premium discounts that reflect reduced risk. Our study aims to an-
swer the following research questions: to what extent are investments in
self-insurance under compulsory insurance coverage for low-prob-
ability/high-impact risk determined by loss probabilities, deductibles,
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and a moral hazard effect? Are financial incentives from insurance ef-
fective in increasing such investments?
1.1. Loss probabilities
Several previous studies have examined the value of self-insurance
and self-protection under different probability levels, using an experi-
mental methodology. In his seminal paper, Shogren (1990) studied
individual responses to risk by self-insurance and self-protection, with
experimental auctions under different probabilities (1%, 10%, 20%,
and 40%). The study found higher investments in both risk reduction
methods under increasing probabilities. Di Mauro and Anna (1996)
examined the valuation of self-insurance and self-protection while
varying the probability levels (3%, 20%, 50%, and 80%). They found
higher bids on self-insurance and self-protection for increasing prob-
abilities. Shafran (2011) examined preferences for self-protection
against low and high probabilities of loss (1%, 2%, 20%, and 40%). In
line with normative predictions from prospect theory, the study found
that subjects were more likely to protect against risks with high prob-
ability than those with low probability and the same expected loss. Note
that they examined self-protection rather than self-insurance, which is a
key difference between this and our own study. More recently,
Ozdemir (2017) compared the valuation of self-insurance and self-
protection under risky and ambiguous prospects with different prob-
abilities of loss (3%, 50%, and 80%) and found that the willingness to
pay for self-insurance increases with probability, but only weakly.
1.2. Moral hazard
A potential difficulty in the promotion of damage-reduction mea-
sures is information asymmetry between the insurer and the policy-
holder regarding implemented measures. This asymmetry can lead to
moral hazard, whereby insured individuals take fewer preventive
measures, as these do not lower their premiums as long as the insurer
cannot observe them (Arrow, 1963; Stiglitz, 1974; Arnott & Stiglitz,
1988). Many studies have empirically investigated moral hazard in
insurance markets (see Cohen and Siegelman, 2010; Rowell and
Connelly, 2012, for an overview), finding that it varies across markets,
depending on the type of insurance product, amongst other factors. In
this regard, studying the effect of insurance coverage on self-insurance
in isolation from other factors enables getting insights into the moral
hazard effect under different probabilities. Some researchers have ex-
amined moral hazard using an experimental approach (see Table A.1).
The contexts vary, including the principal-agent paradigm (work ef-
fort), field experiments on default in micro finance, and studies related
to insurance. The closest to our experiment are Berger and
Hershey (1994) and Di Mauro (2002), as they examine insurance con-
texts. These experiments show that moral hazard is less likely to occur
under deterministic losses and low probability of compensation
(amongst other circumstances).
1.3. Deductibles
To overcome the moral hazard problem, insurance companies have
traditionally adopted deductibles to decrease the coverage of their cli-
ents (Winter, 2013). The deductible is the amount of damage that must
be paid by the policyholder before the insurer will cover any expenses,
which provides a financial incentive to reduce risk for the policyholder.
In other words, the deductible reduces a policyholder‘s level of in-
surance coverage. Some studies used an experimental methodology to
investigate insurance behavior under different levels of deductibles or
insurance coverage. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
previous research that examines the effect of different deductible levels
on investment in risk reduction. Papon (2008) conducted an experiment
on insurance demand with different levels of deductibles (full coverage,
10%, 30%, 50%, and no insurance) under low-probability risks and
found that participants prefer extreme cases of coverage: no insurance
or full insurance. Krieger and Felder (2013) conducted an experiment in
the health insurance domain, where participants could select different
levels of deductibles (full coverage, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%) under
different types of information provision. The results indicate the pre-
sence of a status-quo bias in health insurance policies: respondents
chose their insurance policies based on the default offer. In a related
laboratory experiment, Corcos, Pannequin, and Montmarquette (2017)
examined the demand for insurance coverage by presenting subjects
with 20 equally-spaced deductible options, reaching from no insurance
to full coverage. The results confirmed the bimodal pattern in flood
insurance demand, with clear preferences for both extreme cases.
1.4. Financial incentives
In addition to deductibles, other financial incentives can be pro-
vided to stimulate damage-reduction investment by homeowners, such
as premium discounts that reflect reduced damage due to policyholder’s
investments in self-insurance (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Ou-Yang,
2012; Poussin, Botzen, & Aerts, 2014). Policymakers are increasingly
using financial incentives to facilitate behavioral change in different
domains of society, including health and financial decisions. However,
recent research has shown that these incentives must be carefully de-
signed to be effective (Patel, Asch, Troxel, Fletcher, Osman-Koss, Brady,
Wesby, Hilbert, Zhu, Wang, & Volpp, 2016; Hooker, Wooldridge, Ross,
& Masters, 2018). Financial incentives have been used for decades in
the insurance industry, but studies evaluating the effectiveness of these
are relatively recent (Stevenson, Harris, Mortimer, Wijnands, Tapp,
Peppard, & Buckis, 2018). This paper contributes to the literature by
evaluating the effectiveness of a premium discount and a mitigation
loan on self-insurance in the context of disaster risk insurance. A pre-
mium discount serves as a financial reward for reducing damage, which
is already common practice in health insurance (Tambor, Pavlova,
Golinowska, Arsenijevic, & Groot, 2016). Alternatively, low-interest
mitigation loans may be provided by the government or other financial
institutions to encourage investment in damage-reduction measures
that have high upfront costs, such as flood-proofing a house (Michel-
Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011). Loans spread the investment costs over
time. This can encourage individuals with high discount rates (i.e.,
those who place more emphasis on immediate risk mitigation costs than
on future risk mitigation benefits) to invest in damage reduction mea-
sures. We are not aware of any previous experimental work that directly
tests the influence of these insurance incentives (premium discount and
mitigation loan) on self-insurance investment.
This paper advances the experimental literature on self-insurance by
systematically studying the effects of different probability levels, de-
ductibles, and other financial incentives on self-insurance investments.
Moreover, to our knowledge, moral hazard has not been studied ex-
perimentally in relation to a variety of probability levels and deduc-
tibles. The current study aims to fill this gap by operationalizing in-
vestment in damage-reduction in a controlled lab experiment under
different financial incentive treatments, starting from a baseline treat-
ment without insurance and mitigation incentives. The results are likely
to be useful for insurance companies and policymakers who aim to
increase both insurance coverage and policyholder damage-reduction
activities. Note that the dominant natural risk reduction strategy for
individuals is self-insurance: One cannot prevent a flood or earthquake,
but simple measures such as floodproofing may significantly decrease
damage. Both theory and experiments have shown that policyholders
respond differently to self-insurance than to self-protection (Ehrlich &
Becker, 1972; Shogren, 1990). While most empirical papers concern
self-protection, we cannot simply generalize these results to self-in-
surance. Rather, the drivers of self-insurance should be systematically
examined; and this is an important contribution of the current paper.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the experimental design; Section 3 derives hypotheses for each
J.M. Mol, et al. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101500
2
of the treatments, based on simulations of a theoretical model; Section 4
presents results; Section 5 discusses policy implications; and Section 6
concludes.
2. Experimental design
We examined investment levels in damage-reduction under dif-
ferent financial incentives for mitigation of disaster risk. Participants
were presented with six independent scenarios of an investment game
under flood risk for multiple rounds. The experiment was framed in the
context of insurance, thus all treatments (except “No Insurance”) in-
cluded a deductible.
The experiment consisted of several individual decision-making
tasks, computerized in oTree (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016).
Earnings were in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and converted
back to euros at the end of the game. In the first stage, the initial en-
dowment was earned and invested in a virtual house. As in
Laury, McInnes, and Todd Swarthout (2009), participants were given a
real effort task to earn this endowment, to overcome the “house money
effect” (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Participants were thus shown the
prospect of losing rather than winning money (see Harrison &
Rutström, 2008). One result of an earnings task in which initial earn-
ings are determined by effort could be variability among subjects, with
high performing subjects earning more than low performing subjects,
leading to an unwanted stake effect (Dannenberg, Riechmann, Sturm, &
Vogt, 2012). Therefore, a new real effort task was developed in oTree,2
in which participants were asked to collect ECU by clicking on a grid of
100 boxes which either contained money or did not. The money was
randomly distributed by the software to 60 of the 100 boxes. When 30
boxes with money had been collected, the boxes were deactivated, such
that all subjects finished with the same budget. To enhance a game-like
situation, a timer was placed on the Collect money page, although there
was no consequence of collecting quickly or slowly. (Screenshots of the
new real effort task can be found on page 2 of the Supplementary
Material.) After earning their starting capital, participants were asked
to buy a virtual house (worth 240,000 ECU) with which to play the
investment game. The remainder of the starting capital (75,000 ECU)
was stored as “savings” and could be used to pay for investments,
premiums, and damages. We explained to subjects that the house was
prone to flood risk.
2.1. Investment game
A scenario began with the introduction of the parameters: Flood
probability, maximum damage, and deductible level. This lasted for 12
rounds. The sequence of pages in each round was Invest, Pay premium,
then Flood risk result. The Invest page offered five discrete investment
levels with accompanying benefits, as shown in Fig. 1. Investments
were effective for damage-reduction in all rounds of a scenario, be-
ginning with the investment round. On the Pay premium page, subjects
paid a fair premium (participants were price-takers). After each pay-
ment, the savings balance was adjusted accordingly. The Flood risk re-
sult page showed 100 houses, with the house of the participant in-
dicated by a dotted square. The software selected the flooded house(s)
at random, according to flood probability. The flooded house(s) was
indicated in blue (see Fig. 2). If a participant’s house were flooded, the
deductible (or damage, in the No Insurance treatment) was paid from
the savings balance. After the Flood risk result, an income of 4000 ECU
was added to the savings balance in each round. In each subsequent
round, participants could either invest more or stay with the current
investment (reducing the investment was not possible). Participants in
the “Loan” treatment were offered a 1% interest loan to spread the
investment costs over 10 rounds. When those participants chose a po-
sitive investment level, a Pay loan cost page was added between Invest
and Pay premium. In the No Insurance treatment, the Pay premium page
was skipped. The full experimental instructions can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
The delivery of the instructions was followed by five rounds in a test
scenario to ensure participants were familiar with the game. The in-
structions were available as a pop-up screen throughout the experi-
ment. The test scenario was followed by comprehension questions.
These questions were conditional on treatment and are listed in
Appendix E. The answers could be retrieved from the (pop-up) in-
structions. The software kept track of the number of times a participant
(re)opened the instructions, as well as the number of failed attempts to
answer the comprehension questions. These were used as experimental
control variables in the regression analysis. After answering the com-
prehension questions correctly, subjects began with the first scenario of
the investment game.
2.2. Scenarios
Subjects played 6 scenarios of 12 rounds each, with different flood
probabilities and deductibles per scenario. An overview of the scenarios
is given in Table 1. Their order was randomly shuffled by the software
and was saved to control for order effects. Participants were paid the
final savings balance3 of one randomly chosen scenario, at a conversion
rate of 20,000 ECU = € 1 (between € 0 and € 7 on top of the partici-
pation fee), and the independence of the scenarios was made salient by
a pop-up screen at the start of each scenario. This screen also indicated
the change since the previous scenario in flood probability, deductible,
and premium. When a new scenario began, the savings balance was
restored to the starting value of 75,000 ECU.
In addition to these payments, one participant was randomly se-
lected from the full sample when all sessions had ended. This partici-
pant was rewarded with a large payment: his/her results in one random
scenario or the additional time preferences task were paid at a con-
version rate of 200 ECU = € 1. The fact that each subject had a chance
to earn up to € 700 based on the results in the investment game was
stated on all payment pages, thus highlighting the high stakes of the
experiment. Fig. 3 gives a schematic overview of the experiment.
2.3. Treatments
Participants were randomly distributed over five treatments: No
Insurance ( =n 60), Baseline Insurance ( =n 120), Premium Discount
( =n 59), Loan ( =n 60) and Loan+Discount ( =n 58). The relation
between treatments and our hypotheses is explained in Section 3.2 and
in more detail in Appendix D. Baseline Insurance included only a de-
ductible and served therefore as the baseline mandatory insurance
treatment. As we expected the highest variability in this treatment, we
doubled the number of subjects allocated to it.4 In the Premium Dis-
count treatment, a premium discount was offered to participants if they
invested in damage-reducing measures, proportional to the estimated
damage-reduction. To overcome the effects of time-discounting, the
Loan treatment offered the participants a loan to spread the costs of
investment over multiple rounds. The final treatment, Loan+Discount,
was a combination of the previous two, including both the premium
discount and the mitigation loan. The advantage of this combination is
that it makes the cost-effectiveness of the measures very salient when
the annual premium discounts exceed the annual loan cost.
2 The task was based on the JavaScript code of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
(Holzmeister & Pfurtscheller, 2016) with help of Mathijs Luger, a programmer
of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
3 Savings balance = starting value (75,000 ECU) + income - premiums -
deductibles - damages - investments.
4 As we introduced a novel design, we had no priors regarding effect sizes to
perform a power analysis.
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2.4. Extra tasks
Following the experiment, there were a set of questions and deci-
sion-tasks to gather data on risk preferences, time preferences, and
other behavioral characteristics that could be related to the investment
decisions. Risk preferences were measured using two price lists and the
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) (Crosetto & Filippin, 2013). Based
on a recent review on risk-elicitation tasks (Csermely & Rabas, 2016),
we used the new price list proposed by Drichoutis and Lusk (2016) and
did not include the original (Holt & Laury, 2002). In this new iteration,
probabilities are held constant at 0.50 and the payoff amounts are
varied. This method seems to perform well in forecast accuracy and is
relatively simple. The same price list was adapted from Drichoutis and
Lusk (2016) and framed in the loss domain. In this task, subjects were
first endowed with the maximum possible loss (€ 4.70) and the out-
comes of the lotteries were negative. In both price lists, subjects were
prevented by the oTree software from switching more than once be-
tween options (Holzmeister, 2017): All rows were shown on the screen
simultaneously (see screenshots in Supplementary Material). Finally, a
static version of the BRET by Holzmeister and Pfurtscheller (2016) was
played once. This contained 100 boxes, each worth € 0.05, and one
bomb. Subjects were asked to choose a total number of boxes, which
were then picked at random and opened by the software. The total
value of the opened boxes was earned by the subject, unless the bomb
was among them, which would lead to a payoff of zero. To prevent
income effects, the software selected at random one of the tasks for the
Fig. 1. Investment decision screen in “Baseline Insurance” treatment.
Fig. 2. Flood risk result under low probability - three houses are blue, indicating flooded, and participant is not flooded). (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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payment at the end of the three risk-elicitation tasks.5 The results of the
selected task were shown on the screen and the earnings saved for
payment. For the time preferences, we used the price list of the Pre-
ference Module by Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, Uwe, and
Sunde (2016), where subjects had to choose 25 times between an im-
mediate payment of € 100 and a delayed payment in 12 months. The
delayed payment ranged from € 100 to € 185. Again, consistency was
enforced by the software. After the time preferences, one task was se-
lected for the large payment: one of the six scenarios or the result of the
time preferences task. Note that the time preferences task was thus only
incentivized by the large payment; both ‘immediate’ and delayed time
preferences payments would be paid by bank transfer, which resulted in
a front-end delay with constant transaction costs. A summary of the
payments (participation fee, investment game, and risk-elicitation task)
was given on the next page. At the end of the experiment, subjects were
presented with risk preferences questions and some additional ques-
tions (e.g., beliefs regarding flood risk). The coding of the questions can
be found in Appendix B.
2.5. Procedure
To test the instructions for the newly developed investment game, a
pilot experiment was carried out with Master’s students in October
2017. Subjects were sent a link through which they could play the game
online on their own laptop or desktop computer. The pilot experiment
was made available on the server for one week. All participants were
paid according to their performance in the game by bank transfer, one
week after the pilot. To keep incentives equal for the pilot and the
experiment, all pilot students were eligible for the large payment. The
payment structure was explained verbally in one of the lectures and
again in the invitation e-mail. In total, 20 students took part in the pilot
experiment. They earned an average of approximately € 12.00 in 34
minutes. We were mostly interested in testing the procedure and the
average time required to finish the game. The pilot students finished
faster than expected, and many invested in all scenarios. To increase
heterogeneity in investment decisions across subjects, we added two
scenarios to the game with an extra low deductible and two more risk
levels in the No Insurance treatment. To test the length of the final
procedure, a second pilot was conducted with five PhD students in our
institute. No major changes were made after the second pilot.
The experiment was conducted in the CREED lab of the University
of Amsterdam in November 2017. A total of 361 participants earned an
average of € 12.95 in 29 minutes. We conducted 11 sessions in 4 days.
Note that subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment by the soft-
ware; hence different treatments were played during one experimental
session. Three subjects participated twice due to a minor error with the
subject database. The results of their second experiment were removed
from the analysis. One result was incomplete, as this subject did not
finish the final survey, and the result was thus removed. This left 357
observations for analysis. All earnings - except the large payment,
which included the time preferences payment - were paid out privately,
Table 1
Overview of scenarios by treatment, deductible (xL, L, H) and probability (L,
H).
Treatment Deductible Probability
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
No Insurance 1.00 1% L- 5% 10% H- 20%
Baseline Insurance 0.05 n.a. LxL n.a. n.a. HxL n.a.
0.15 n.a. LL n.a. n.a. HL n.a.
0.20 n.a. LH n.a. n.a. HH n.a.
Premium Discount 0.05 n.a. LxL n.a. n.a. HxL n.a.
0.15 n.a. LL n.a. n.a. HL n.a.
0.20 n.a. LH n.a. n.a. HH n.a.
Loan 0.05 n.a. LxL n.a. n.a. HxL n.a.
0.15 n.a. LL n.a. n.a. HL n.a.
0.20 n.a. LH n.a. n.a. HH n.a.
Loan+Discount 0.05 n.a. LxL n.a. n.a. HxL n.a.
0.15 n.a. LL n.a. n.a. HL n.a.
0.20 n.a. LH n.a. n.a. HH n.a.
Notes: Initial wealth = 75,000; Maximum damage = 50,000; Interest rate Loan
treatments = 1%; Nr of installments in Loan treatments = 10; Premium = (1 -
Deductible) × Probability × Damage. n.a. = not applicable.
Fig. 3. Schematic overview of the experiment.
5 Subjects were informed about this procedure before the start of the first risk-
elicitation task, which was introduced together with the others as ‘additional
tasks’.
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in cash, immediately after the experiment. The large payment was ar-
ranged via bank transfer, after all sessions had ended.6
3. Theory and hypotheses
Based on the previous literature referred to in Section 1, we de-
veloped several hypotheses, which we then tested in the lab experi-
ment. The parameters of the experiment were based on simulations of a
theoretical model, as described in Appendix C.
3.1. Simulations
We used a comparative statics approach to predict best responses to
the simplest hypothesis (a comparison between Baseline Insurance and
No Insurance), reported in Appendix C. However, no clear-cut analy-
tical solution was found for the other hypotheses. Therefore, we pre-
dicted the best response of risk-averse (versus neutral, seeking) and low
(versus high) time-discounting individuals investing in self-insurance
under each treatment based on simulations of the theory. We used these
simulations to set our experimental parameters, such that all hy-
potheses could be tested with the lab experiment. The results of these
simulations, which are based on Eq. C.2, are reported in Appendix D.
The final set of parameters includes initial wealth =W 75,000, max-
imum loss =V 50,000, effectiveness of self-insurance = 0.00008,
number of installments in Loan treatment = 10 and interest rate = 1%.
The following section provides the hypotheses and the intuition behind
them.
3.2. Hypotheses
From the comparative statics in Appendix C, we know that invest-
ments under insurance coverage (Baseline Insurance) should be lower
than without coverage (No Insurance). In general, Winter (2013) states
that even though moral hazard is considered as a major issue in in-
surance from a theoretical perspective, empirical results are mixed. An
overview of empirical studies on moral hazard has been carried out by
Cohen and Siegelman (2010). The authors conclude that the existence
of moral hazard is largely dependent on the type of insurance market. In
survey studies, moral hazard has been found to play only a minor role
in voluntary flood insurance markets (Hudson, Botzen, Czajkowski, &
Kreibich, 2017; Thieken, Petrow, Kreibich, & Merz, 2006). Therefore,
the first hypothesis concerns the role of moral hazard in the flood risk
insurance context. In simulations of the theory (Appendix D), damage-
reduction investments in the Baseline Insurance treatment are lower
than in the No Insurance treatment. Positive investments in the Baseline
Insurance treatment may be optimal in high-probability scenarios, de-
pending on the deductible level and attitude to risk.
Hypothesis 1. Damage-reduction investments in the Baseline Insurance
treatment are lower than in the No Insurance treatment, but greater
than zero.
In line with risk-based insurance premiums, researchers
(Kunreuther, 1996; Surminski, Aerts, Botzen, Hudson, Mysiak, & Pérez-
Blanco, 2015) and policymakers (European Commission, 2013) have
suggested that a premium discount may motivate policyholders to take
mitigation measures. So far, there is little empirical evidence of the
effectiveness of premium discounts, except for the findings of
Botzen, Aerts, and van den Bergh (2009), which concern the willingness
of a large sample of Dutch homeowners in floodplains to pay for low-
cost flood-mitigation measures. The researchers found that the main
incentive for investment was the premium discount on the flood in-
surance policy that was offered in the survey. The following hypothesis
therefore concerns the Premium Discount treatment. The simulations in
Appendix D show that damage-reduction investments should be higher
in the Premium Discount treatment than in the Baseline Insurance
treatment, under all scenarios and risk attitudes.
Hypothesis 2a. Damage-reduction investments are higher in the
Premium Discount treatment than in the Baseline Insurance treatment.
A second financial incentive to promote policyholder damage-re-
duction measures is a mitigation loan or a payment in installments
(Michel-Kerjan, 2010), aimed at individuals who heavily discount the
future. This treatment could overcome both high time-discounting and
a moral hazard effect. The Loan+Discount treatment could be pow-
erful, assuming that a considerable share of individuals is risk-averse
and present-oriented. Therefore, we expect that the combination of
incentives will lead to the largest damage-reduction investment. The
simulations in Appendix D indicate that Loan+Discount gives the
highest optimal investments for all treatments in the low-probability
scenarios.
Hypothesis 2b. Damage-reduction investments are largest in the Loan
+Discount treatment.
Policyholder damage-reduction measures may be cost-effective
under expected utility theory (Kreibich, Bubeck, van Vliet, & De Moel,
2015), but myopic individuals with high discount rates weigh the
present costs much more heavily than the projected future benefits.
Damage-reduction investments are lower in the Baseline Insurance and
Premium Discount treatments under high time-discounting, according
to our simulations. A mitigation loan may overcome this discounting
effect by spreading the costs over multiple periods. The simulations
indeed show that in the Loan and Loan+Discount treatments, time-
discounting has no effect on damage-reduction investment.
Hypothesis 3a. Damage-reduction investments are lower among
participants with high time discount rates. This effect is strongest in
the Baseline Insurance and Premium Discount treatments, and it
disappears in the Loan and Loan+Discount treatments.
Hudson et al. (2017) argue that in natural disaster markets, deci-
sions are mainly driven by risk attitudes, where highly risk-averse in-
dividuals take multiple precautionary measures, including flood in-
surance and flood damage-reduction measures. In this scenario,
advantageous selection may prevail over the moral hazard effect, which
may be explained by a misunderstanding of risk (Kunreuther &
Pauly, 2004). However, Hudson et al. (2017) did not examine the be-
havioral mechanisms to back up their claim. The current experiment
aims to fill that gap. The simulations show that risk-seeking individuals
will not invest in the Baseline Insurance and Loan treatments, while
investing 1000 or 5000 could be optimal for risk-neutral individuals
and 10,000 for risk-averse individuals.
Hypothesis 3b. Risk-averse individuals will invest more in damage-
reduction in the Baseline Insurance treatment and the Loan treatment
than risk-neutral individuals will, while risk-seeking individuals will
invest less.
4. Results
This section reports our results, beginning with the moral hazard
effect (Hypothesis 1) and the effect of financial incentives related to
insurance (loan and premium discount, Hypotheses 2a and 2b) with
non-parametric tests and a multivariate regression analysis. Subse-
quently, we examine the effect of time and risk preferences on invest-
ment behavior (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). Finally, we present some ad-
ditional analyses, including a trend analysis and the effects of flood
beliefs on investment behavior. We conclude with an overview of the
6 Large earnings ranged from € 86.70 to € 615. The randomly selected par-
ticipant earned € 196.49 from one of the scenarios. The payment was thus made
immediately and not delayed by 12 months, which could have happened if the
time preferences payment had been selected.
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predicted margins of our key findings, comparing investments in self-
insurance under different loss probabilities, deductibles, and financial
incentives.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the demographic variables
that should not be influenced by our experimental treatments. Demo-
graphic variables did not significantly vary between treatment groups.7
We further analyzed the balance of the flood perception variables ef-
ficacy, worry, and regret across treatments, which were measured in a
post-experimental survey and could be affected by different versions of
the investment game.8 Precise coding of the variables can be found in
Appendix B.
4.1. Testing the moral hazard effect
To test Hypothesis 1, we compared the investment levels in the
Baseline Insurance treatment with those in the No Insurance treatment.
We began with a non-parametric analysis of the most independent unit
of observation: The first round. A one-sided t-test revealed that the
average investment in the first round of Baseline Insurance was sig-
nificantly higher than 0, both in the high-probability scenario
( =M 4049.59,BaselineHL =t 9.20, =df 120, p < 0.0000) and in the low-
probability scenario ( =M 2404.96,BaselineLL =t 6.22, =df 120,
p < 0.0000). Fig. 4 shows the average investments in the first round in
Baseline Insurance (gray boxes) and No Insurance (black boxes), split
by probability and deductible levels (shade of gray). Note that the No
Insurance treatment is equivalent to a 100% deductible.
Table 3 shows the average investment in the first round, by treat-
ment.9 Significant differences between investments in Baseline In-
surance and No Insurance are indicated by asterisks in the third column
of the table (non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) tests).
The results show significant differences for the high-probability sce-
narios, indicating a moral hazard effect: subjects invest less in damage-
reduction when insurance is available and probabilities are high.
However, we do not observe such a strong effect in the low-probability
scenarios. Only in the scenario with the smallest deductible (5%) do
subjects invest slightly less than in a scenario without insurance
(p < 0.1).
To test Hypothesis 1 over all 12 rounds of the investment game, we
ran panel regressions with scenario dummies and controls. We opted for
a random effects ML specification10 to control for subject and scenario
effects. All explanatory variables were checked for high correlations to
rule out issues of multicollinearity. As all correlation coefficients were
smaller than 0.5, multicollinearity is not regarded as problematic
(Field, 2009). The dependent variable is the log-transformed11 damage-
reducing investment. Table 4 restricts the sample to the Baseline In-
surance and No Insurance treatments. The results show the same pat-
tern as in the non-parametric tests. In the high-probability scenarios
(15%), we find significantly less investment in damage-reduction when
insurance is available under all deductible levels. In the low-probability
scenarios, we only find lower investments when the deductible is par-
ticularly small (5%). The regression results confirm that there is no
moral hazard effect in the low-probability scenarios (3%), under low
(15%) or high (20%) deductible levels. The negative and significant
estimates for order of scenario indicate that damage-reducing invest-
ment declines with experience. Note that the order of scenarios was
determined at random by the software.
Overall, we find mixed support for Hypothesis 1. There is no sig-
nificant difference between investments in the No Insurance and
Baseline Insurance treatments in the low-probability scenario, which
suggests that there is no moral hazard in an insurance market where
probabilities are low and expected damages are high, while moral ha-
zard might occur with increasing probabilities of damage. The latter
finding is in line with previous literature on moral hazard in different
insurance markets (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Under low probabilities
and high expected damages, a substantial share of the “cautious” types
might decide to insure and invest in damage-reducing investments.
Note, however, that the probability information in this experiment was
objective information.
4.2. Testing financial incentives to increase self-insurance
Next, we investigated the effect of financial incentives related to
insurance on investments in damage-reduction. Hypothesis 2a concerns
the effect of the Premium Discount treatment. Table 3 shows non-
parametrically for round 1 that subjects invest significantly more in the
Premium Discount treatment than in the Baseline Insurance treatment,
regardless of risk and deductible levels. Table 5 presents the results of a
Table 2
Descriptive statistics per treatment group.
No Insurance Insurance Baseline Discount Loan Loan+Discount p-value
Age in years 21.05 21.89 21.39 21.17 21.48 0.593
(2.22) (4.82) (2.33) (3.24) (3.60)
Gender (1 = female) 0.58 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.67 0.264
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
Income (1 = above € 5000) 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.364
(0.22) (0.18) (0.29) (0.25) (0.13)
Risk averse 5.65 5.83 5.79 5.82 5.81 0.932
(1.30) (1.14) (1.34) (1.36) (1.39)
Present biased 13.49 14.02 12.39 13.05 12.70 0.726
(7.80) (8.17) (8.19) (8.05) (8.62)
Observations 59 121 57 60 60
Notes: Table displays means, SD in parentheses. Final column presents the p-value for an F-test of the null hypothesis of equal means across the treatment groups.
7 Note, however, that the benefit of balancing checks after experimental
randomization is debatable (see e.g. Mutz & Pemantle, 2015 or Deaton &
Cartwright, 2018 for recent discussions).
8 Significant differences were found for efficacy of protection ( =p .008) and
regret about investment ( =p .000), but not for worry and regret about no in-
vestment. Participants in the Discount treatments reported higher efficacy va-
lues, which may be caused by a positive experience of mitigation measures due
to the financial benefit of the premium discount. Furthermore, participants
reported lower regret values in case of investment without a flood event in the
game. This finding is consistent with the design of the Discount treatment,
where participants received benefits (namely, premium discounts) of their self-
insurance investments regardless of flood events.
9 Note that both Table 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate investments in the first round in
ECU. However, Table 3 presents means, while Fig. 4 presents medians.
10 To control for unobservable subject-specific and scenario-specific effects,
we created subject-scenario dummies and used these to cluster standard errors.
The random effects ML estimates are not conditional on subject and time effects
to account for clustered standard errors per subject and scenario (see e.g. Bell &
Jones, 2015).
11 We used the transformation = +transformed investmentlog( 1) to deal with
0 investments.
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random-effects panel regression ML estimates, which takes all rounds
into account, as well as treatment dummies, scenario dummies, de-
mographics, and various controls. We chose a panel specification to
account for the correlation of decisions by the same subject and clus-
tered standard errors by id (subject) and scenario. All models control
for (1) attempts to answer understanding questions,12 (2) perceived
difficulty, (3) flood risk perception, (4) one over round to control for
experience, and (5) order of scenario × probability interaction; but
coefficients have been suppressed for brevity. The positive coefficients
of the Premium Discount treatment confirm the results of the non-
parametric analysis: a premium discount leads to larger investment.
This effect is large and statistically significant under all possible con-
trols. We can therefore confirm Hypothesis 2a: A premium discount
leads to larger damage-reduction investment, compared to a baseline
insurance situation.
The Loan treatment, however, does not encourage subjects to invest
more in damage-reduction. Neither the non-parametric analysis in
Table 3, nor the multivariate regression analysis in Table 5 reveal a
significant effect of the Loan treatment, compared to the Baseline In-
surance treatment. We expected a positive investment effect for the
Loan+Discount treatment (Hypothesis 2b). In that case, the economic
return on the loan was salient on the decision screen, because cost ef-
fective investments show lower annual costs than benefits in terms of
the premium discount. Average investment in the first round in the
Loan+Discount treatment, as displayed in Table 3 is lower than in the
Premium Discount treatment in almost all scenarios. These results are
confirmed by the negative insignificant estimates of the Loan × Dis-
count dummy in Table 5 after controlling for Premium Discount only.
Hypothesis 2b thus finds no support in the data.
Our findings could be explained by the dislike for the mandatory 1%
interest in the Loan treatment, or a general dislike of lending among the
students in our sample. Alternatively, one could argue that the oper-
ationalization of a Loan treatment in the lab lacks external validity,13 as
Fig. 4. Boxplots of investments in the first round, by probability and deductible. Boxplot whiskers indicate the inter-quartile range, middle lines represent medians.
Table 3
Average investment in the first round in ECU.
No Insurance Baseline Insurance Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
scenario H- 7,288.14
(5717.64)
scenario HH 5,421.49** 9,233.33*** 3,816.67 8,614.04***
(5,431.01) (5,732.35) (3716.62) (5,512.18)
scenario HL 4,049.59*** 8,416.67*** 3,050.00 7,807.02***
(4,843.98) (5,681.64) (4,188.06) (5,717.89)
scenario HxL 3,471.07*** 8,966.67*** 3,500.00 7,771.93***
(5,010.11) (5,971.59) (5,000.00) (5,840.19)
scenario L- 2,711.86
(4,102.36)
scenario LH 2,727.27 3,850.00** 1,883.33 3,719.30
(4,222.95) (4,398.86) (3,796.04) (4,806.08)
scenario LL 2,404.96 3,283.33* 1,750.00 3,421.05
(4,253.58) (4,584.76) (4,015.33) (5,119.81)
scenario LxL 1,793.39* 3,550.00*** 1,633.33 2,087.72
(3,976.84) (4,560.05) (3,723.34) (3,434.49)
Observations 59 121 60 60 57
Notes: Table reports means, st.dev in parentheses. Asterisks in the Baseline Insurance column indicate significant differences with the No Insurance treatment.
Asterisks in last three columns indicate significant differences with the Baseline Insurance treatment (MMW tests, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
12 One subject attempted the comprehension questions more than 10 times.
For robustness, we re-ran all analyses excluding this subject. The results do not
change qualitatively.
13 Note that lab experiments are in general low in external validity, although
we did all we could to increase external validity: an engaging task explained
with parameters based on real data, an incentive compatible payment scheme
and a high stakes random lottery incentive mechanism to mimic the large
consequences of flood risk investment decisions.
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the investment costs are spread over 12 rounds, ranging from seconds to
minutes in the lab, rather than years, as in the real world. However,
incorporating true intertemporal payoffs would require a complicated
experimental design, in which subjects were to return to the lab to pay
back their loans. We considered this impossible to enforce. Further
research on loans in the context of disaster risk reduction should
therefore focus on field rather than lab experiments.
4.3. The effect of time and risk preferences
To examine our last two hypotheses, we use the multivariate re-
gression analysis reported in Table 5. We find no effect of time-dis-
counting on investments,14 suggesting no support for Hypothesis 3a.
The risk-aversion variable is a linear combination of our four risk-
elicitation methods,15 as in Menkhoff and Sakha (2017). We find that
risk-averse subjects invest more in damage-reducing investments, pro-
viding evidence for Hypothesis 3b. Table F.1 provides additional ro-
bustness checks for each of the four risk-elicitation methods. The di-
rection of the risk aversion effect is equal for all elicitation methods and
the estimates of other variables do not change qualitatively.
4.4. Additional results
In addition to the evaluation of our hypotheses, some other inter-
esting patterns emerge from our data. Model 2 in Table 5 includes three
control variables that varied between rounds: participant flooded in the
previous round, direct neighbors (see Fig. 5) flooded in the previous
round, and decision time in seconds at the Invest screen. The positive
and significant estimate for decision time shows that investments are
greater when subjects spend more time on the Invest page. This effect
may be explained by the decisions in the first round requiring some
deliberation, while subjects learn to move quickly to the next page
without extra investments in later rounds. The neighbor variable was
constructed to control for erroneous impressions of spatial correlations
between floods in the game. Both participant- and neighbor-flooded
variables are not significant. Note that the dependent variable here is
log-transformed investment, which may not differ substantially be-
tween rounds. In Appendix F, we specifically analyze ‘extra invest-
ments’ and find that subjects invest extra in damage-reduction after
experiencing floods themselves, but not when a neighbor has been
flooded in the game.
Model 3 includes demographic variables. All else being equal, we
find that investments decrease slightly with age, that women invest
significantly more than men, and that subjects with a high income in
real life invest less in damage-reduction in the game. In Model 4, we
further include variables concerning flood beliefs. We observe sig-
nificant and positive coefficients of believed efficacy of protective
measures and worry about flooding. A significant negative estimate is
seen for regret of investment. Note that this question was asked after
the experiment had ended, thus the causal direction is likely to be re-
versed: subjects who invested significantly less indicated in the post-
experimental survey that they felt regret about investing when no flood
occurred.
Fig. 6 shows the average damage-reducing investments per round
and scenario of all subjects in the Baseline Insurance and No Insurance
treatments. It is no surprise that investments do not decrease, as this
was not an option for subjects during a scenario. Note that investments
were effective for all subsequent rounds: Investing in the first round
leads to the highest expected benefits over all rounds. Still, average
investments increase through the rounds, with the largest increase in
the high-probability treatments of the No Insurance treatment. This can
be explained by a small share of individuals who initially invest little
and realize during the game that they want more protection, following
the experience of a flood (see Appendix F). In our initial design, the No
Insurance treatment contained only two scenarios (H- 15% probability
and L- 3% probability), where all other treatments tested six scenarios.
To keep the workload for all participants approximately equal, we
added four scenarios to the No Insurance treatment to study the effect
of expected value of flood losses on investments with a more refined
pattern of probabilities. Fig. 6 also shows that subjects did invest more
when the expected value of a loss increased (i.e., higher deductible
and/or higher probability). These extra probability scenarios in the No
Insurance treatment are not included in any of the other analyses.
4.5. Predicted margins
Finally, Fig. 7 summarizes our key findings with regards to the ef-
fects of probabilities, deductibles and financial incentives for self-in-
surance investments. It shows the adjusted predicted margins at the
95% confidence level of a log-transformed OLS regression of interac-
tions between probabilities, deductibles, and treatments in the first
round. For readability, the null-effect of the Loan treatment is not dis-
played. The graph further facilitates comparison of effect sizes. For
example, adding a premium discount in the low-probability scenarios
leads to a similar increase in self-insurance investments as that seen
when increasing the probability of loss from 1% to 5%.
4.5.1. Loss probabilities
The black diamond markers in Fig. 7 show that respondents in-
vested more in self-insurance when they were confronted with a higher
probability of loss, confirming the results of Fig. 6. However, the in-
crease in investment is not proportional to the increase in loss prob-
abilities, which is in line with experimental work on the relationship
between probabilities and self-protection investments (Shafran, 2011;
Ozdemir, 2017).
4.5.2. Moral hazard
The graph further illustrates the mixed findings around the moral
hazard problem. In the high-probability scenarios, we find evidence for
Table 4
Random effects ML panel regression estimates of investments.
(1) (2)
Probability L: 3% Probability H: 15%
Deductible (ref. No Insurance)
H: 20% −0.171 −1.089*
(0.561) (0.562)
L: 15% −0.501 −1.894***
(0.561) (0.562)
xL: 5% −1.611*** −3.182***
(0.561) (0.563)









Nr of subjects 163 163
AIC 14,867 14,488
Log likelihood −7,415 −7,225
Notes: Standard errors clustered by id and scenario in parentheses (* p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Controls: age, gender, high income, understanding,
perceived difficulty, flood risk perception, risk aversion, time preferences,
worry, perceived efficacy, regret, 1/round. Dependent variable log-trans-
formed.
14 We have included an interaction term of time-discounting × Loan, but the
results were not statistically significant.
15 See Section 2.4 for a description of these tasks.
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Table 5
Random-effects ML panel regression estimates on log-transformed damage-reducing investments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatments Previous rounds Demographics Flood beliefs
Treatment (ref. Baseline Insurance)
Discount 2.372*** 2.370*** 2.200*** 1.916***
(0.230) (0.230) (0.228) (0.248)
Loan −0.169 −0.169 −0.172 0.099
(0.231) (0.231) (0.227) (0.234)
Loan × Discount −0.455 −0.457 −0.241 −0.285
(0.356) (0.356) (0.351) (0.367)
Probability (ref. L: 3%)
H: 15% 1.301*** 1.301*** 1.374*** 1.649***
(0.386) (0.386) (0.379) (0.390)
Deductible (ref. xL: 5%)
L: 15% 0.597*** 0.596*** 0.597*** 0.708***
(0.207) (0.207) (0.203) (0.209)
H: 20% 1.163*** 1.162*** 1.163*** 1.223***
(0.207) (0.207) (0.203) (0.209)
Order of scenario −0.556*** −0.554*** −0.543*** −0.493***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.071)
Participant flooded −0.018 −0.018 −0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Neighbor flooded −0.012 −0.012 0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Decision time round 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age in years −0.086*** −0.064***
(0.022) (0.023)
Gender (1 = female) 0.867*** 0.618***
(0.171) (0.181)
Income (1 = above € 5,000) −0.989** −1.141***
(0.396) (0.407)
Risk averse 0.221*** 0.262***
(0.067) (0.069)




Worried about flood 0.389***
(0.092)
Regret no investment / flood 0.108
(0.088)
Regret investment / no flood −0.267***
(0.079)
Constant 4.810*** 4.808*** 4.891*** 1.928**
(0.423) (0.423) (0.761) (0.932)
σu 3.554*** 3.554*** 3.490*** 3.416***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
σe 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.972***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 21,456 21,456 21,456 19,440
Nr of subjects 298 298 298 270
AIC 69,251 69,227 69,172 62,245
Log likelihood −34,610 −34,594 −34,562 −31,094
Notes: Standard errors clustered by id and scenario in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Controls: Understanding questions, perceived difficulty,
flood risk perception, 1/round, scenario-order × probability. Model 4 excludes the 28 subjects of session 1 because of incomplete efficacy responses. For robustness,
we ran Models 1, 2 and 3 without these subjects; the results do not change.
Fig. 5. Grey color indicates direct neighbors for construction of neighbors variable.
J.M. Mol, et al. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101500
10
moral hazard: self-insurance investments are significantly lower in the
Baseline treatment (indicated with gray triangles) than the No
Insurance treatment (indicated with black diamonds). The only sig-
nificant difference in the low-probability scenarios, however, is under
the lowest deductible. In other words, a large deductible (at least 15%)
may alleviate the moral hazard problem in a low-probability/high-im-
pact context. This finding validates the empirical conjecture that moral
hazard is absent in low-probability/high-impact insurance markets
(Thieken et al., 2006; Hudson et al., 2017).
4.5.3. Deductibles
The effect of deductibles is represented in Fig. 7 on the x-axis of
each subplot. The figure shows that, in line with theoretical predictions,
increasing the deductible leads to slightly higher investments in self-
Fig. 6. Average investment in damage-reducing measures by scenario.
Fig. 7. Adjusted predictions of log-transformed investments in the first round by treatment, deductible, and probability of loss. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. We used the marginsplot command in Stata to create this figure.
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insurance. We thus find support for the substitution hypothesis of
Carson, Mccullough, and Pooser (2013), which theorizes that insurance
and mitigation may be substitute goods. The deductible effect is smal-
lest in the low-probability (3%) scenarios, which confirms previous
survey research in natural disaster insurance markets (Hudson et al.,
2017).
4.5.4. Financial incentives
Fig. 7 shows that a premium discount (indicated with white squares)
can significantly increase investment in self-insurance, although the
effect is largest under high probability of loss and low levels of de-
ductibles. Note that the premium discount is based on the expected
value of damage-reduction, leading to a larger premium discount in
absolute terms in the high-probability scenarios. The finding that a
premium discount can be effective in increasing self-insurance invest-
ments even under low probabilities of loss, confirms previous empirical
studies (Botzen et al., 2009; Hudson et al., 2016).
5. Implications for disaster risk management
Both the effects of climate change and ongoing socio-economic
development in floodplains are contributing to the projected increase in
flood damage (Jongman, Hochrainer-Stigler, Feyen, Aerts, Mechler,
Botzen, Bouwer, Pflug, Rojas, & Ward, 2014). Floods are one of the
costliest extreme weather events worldwide, with more than 26 billion
US dollars in losses in 2017 (Munich RE, 2018). Flood risk insurance is
often mandatory or at least heavily regulated when provided by private
insurers. The implementation of mandatory insurance in our experi-
ment closely resembles the characteristics of many natural disaster in-
surance markets (Paudel, Botzen, & Aerts, 2012), for which it is im-
possible to distill moral hazard by survey and market data because a
control group without insurance coverage does not exist in practice.
Our experiment investigated the effect of deductibles, financial in-
centives, and time and risk preferences on private investments for re-
ducing disaster risk damage. These investments can be taken by in-
dividual homeowners and are cost-effective in reducing flood risk
(Poussin, Wouter Botzen, & Aerts, 2015; Kreibich, Christenberger, &
Schwarze, 2011). While the estimated prevented damage can be sub-
stantial (Kreibich et al., 2015), only a small proportion of homeowners
has currently taken these measures.
Our results reveal why current voluntary take-up rates of damage
mitigation measures are low and how they might be improved. For
example, policyholders should be well-informed about cost-effective
ways of reducing damage. Furthermore, appeals to negative feelings
about flooding (in terms of worry) may stimulate investment in flood
damage mitigation measures. Although deductibles have a significant
impact on damage-reduction, the size of this effect is not very large,
which draws into question the effectiveness of high deductibles for
stimulating policyholder flood risk reduction activities. Moreover, our
finding that moral hazard effects are minor when probabilities of da-
mage are low suggests that there is less need for high deductibles to
limit such an effect. Premium discounts are likely to be a more effective
way of stimulating policyholders to reduce flood risk.
In the face of increasing disaster risk, such as climate change, it is
important to understand individual preparedness and risk-reduction
activities. In our No Insurance treatment, we systematically varied the
yearly probability of loss in six scenarios, from 1% to 20%. The results
show that damage-reducing investment increases with loss probability,
but less than proportionately. Hence, there is a need to improve in-
dividual preparedness in the face of increasing disaster risk.
Experiencing a flood in the game triggers extra investment in flood
damage mitigation measures. It is more beneficial for people to take
such measures before a flood, rather than after, which highlights the
need to explore the effectiveness of incentives that motivate people to
reduce risk ex ante flood events. Future work could examine the be-
havior of homeowners in floodplains, who might respond differently
due to their greater experience with insurance and possibly flooding
than the current student sample.
6. Conclusion
With economic losses due to natural disasters expected to increase,
it is important to study risk reduction strategies, including individual
investments of homeowners in damage-reducing (mitigation) measures.
Different options exist for policyholders to reduce risk, including self-
insurance and self-protection. While there is an extensive literature on
the empirical regularities related to insurance demand and self-pro-
tection, research on the drivers of self-insurance is limited. This study
contributes to the discussion by investigating the relevant dimensions
of heterogeneity of self-insurance under compulsory insurance coverage
for low-probability/high-impact risk. These characteristics include
probability levels, deductibles, and other financial incentives, which
cannot be varied systematically in actual insurance markets. A new
investment game was developed to study the causal relationship be-
tween financial incentives related to insurance and self-insurance in-
vestments, taking into account behavioral characteristics of individuals
in an insurance market with mandatory coverage.
We found that subjects invested more when the expected value of a
loss increased (higher deductible and/or higher probability of loss),
although this increase in investment was not proportional to the in-
crease in risk. Furthermore, we identified that the investments in the No
Insurance treatment were significantly higher than in the Baseline
Insurance treatment for the high-probability (15%) scenarios, but not
significantly different in most low-probability (3%) scenarios. Mean
investments in Baseline Insurance were greater than zero, confirming
our conjecture that moral hazard is less of a problem in an insurance
market where probabilities of damage are low and expected damages
are high. Regarding financial incentives for damage-reduction, our re-
sults indicate that a premium discount can increase investment in da-
mage-reduction, while the availability of a mitigation loan does not
increase investments. Behavioral characteristics that have a positive
effect on these investments are risk aversion, perceived efficacy of
protective measures, and anticipated regret.
While the current research focuses on mandatory insurance, in-
formation asymmetries such as moral hazard may also emerge in in-
surance markets where policyholders are able to select the level of
coverage. Future work could examine the interplay between financial
incentives and behavioral characteristics in these voluntary insurance
schemes. Another important topic for further research is uncertainty
about the future. For simplicity, our participants played a fixed number
of rounds in the game. An interesting possibility would be to add a
random stopping rule to the game to mimic the indefinite time horizon
of real-world policyholders.
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Appendix B. Variable coding
Appendix C. Comparative statics
The following section briefly describes the model, which extends the expected utility framework on optimal loss mitigation of Kelly and
Kleffner (2003) to a multiple-years framework. Note that mitigation refers to investments that reduce the size of a potential loss but not the
probability, which is known as self-insurance in the original model by Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
First, consider the one-year framework. Consider an individual with initial wealth W who faces a loss V with probability p and no loss with
probability p1 . The individual has the possibility to reduce the size of the loss by implementing mitigation expenditures r. The effectiveness of
mitigation is captured in the mitigation function L(r) that denotes the maximum possible loss if r is spent on mitigation. If a consumer does not spend
anything on mitigation, the size of the loss will be V. Increasing mitigation expenditures leads to a decrease of maximum possible loss such that
=L V(0) and L′(r) < 0. Finally, assume that L″(r) ≤ 0, meaning that the marginal effectiveness of mitigation decreases with an increase in
mitigation expenditures. Insurance coverage is mandatory to protect against the possible loss, with a coverage of α ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the
insurance contains a deductible of 1 per dollar of coverage. The term αL(r) denotes the compensation in case of a loss. The insurer sets the
premium απ, where = pL (0). The insurer does not observe r and, hence, does not give premium discounts for risk reduction. The individual will
choose a level of r to maximize expected utility EU:
= +EU p U W r pU W L r rmax (1 ) [ ] [ (1 ) ( ) ]r (C.1)
Now consider the multi-year framework. The model is constructed such that the policyholder considers a damage reduction investment in the
present based on of the net present value of utility in both the present year (in which he/she considers an investment in mitigation) and in the years
to come. For simplicity, we assume that the policyholder can invest only once, namely in the first year. A parallel with reality may be that you cannot
elevate your house twice. Thus, the costs of mitigation r are paid in the first year =t 1 only, while the benefits (a decrease in L) extend in the future
up to and including the last year T. Future years are discounted with a discount factor δ (see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). The
individual will choose a level of r to maximize expected utility EU:
= +
+ += +
EU p U W r pU W L r r
p U W pU W L r
max (1 ) [ ] [ (1 ) ( ) ]








(1 ) t 1 (C.2)
We aimed to derive theoretical predictions based on comparative statics for each of our treatments. We start with the simplest case: the effect of
insurance coverage, by comparing the Insurance Baseline and the No Insurance treatments (Hypothesis 1).
C1. Insurance Baseline versus No Insurance
Coverage α determines the difference between the Insurance Baseline and the No Insurance treatments. We determine the optimal investment in
mitigation r in relation to α. Taking the derivative of Eq. C.2 with respect to r leads to the first order condition:
= +
== +
F p U W r p L r U W L r r
p L r U W L r
(1 ) [ ] ((1 ) ( ) 1) [ (1 ) ( ) )]






(1 ) t 1 (C.3)
Using the implicit function theorem:
Table B1
Summary overview of the variables used in the statistical analysis.
Age Continuous variable, age in years
Gender Dummy variable, 1 = participant is female
High income Dummy variable, 1 = monthly household after-tax income is within the highest category > € 5000
Worried about flood Categorical variable (range 1–5), worried about danger of flooding at current residence, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
Regret no investment Categorical variable (range 1–5), I felt regret about not investing in protection when a flood occurred in the game, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree
Regret investment Categorical variable (range 1–5), when in a certain year in the game no flood occurred, I felt regret about paying for protection, 1 = strongly disagree, 5
= strongly agree
Risk averse Risk aversion index: weighted average of four risk elicitation methods, 1 = very risk seeking, 10 = very risk averse
Present biased Switching row in time lista (range 1–26), 1 = no time discounting, 26 = high time discounting
Efficacy protection Categorical variable (range 0–10), How effective do you consider investing in flood protection measures that limit flood damageb, 0 = very ineffective,
10 = very effective
Participant flooded Dummy variable, 1 = participant flooded in previous round
Neighbor flooded Dummy variable, 1 = one or more neighborsc flooded in previous round
a Time list parameters from Falk et al. (2016).
b This question was taken from Poussin et al. (2014).
c see Fig. 5.




Fulfilled second order condition implies:
<F 0r
Abbreviating W r1 as nL1, W L r r(1 ) ( )1 as L1 and W L r(1 ) ( )t as Lt:
= + +
+ = + = +
F p U nL p L r L r U L L r pU L
L r p U L p L r L r U L
(1 ) ( ) ((1 ) ( ) 1)( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )










(1 )t t1 1 (C.4)
If we assume < L r1 |(1 ) ( )| and a concave utility function, F is negative. Then:
<r 0 (C.5)
Under more insurance coverage, optimal investment in r decreases, which is part of Hypothesis 1.
C2. Loan treatment
We have found a comparative statics prediction for the simplest treatment, under the assumption that < L r1 |(1 ) ( )|. This holds for the
parameters used in our experiment, but it is not necessarily always the case. Furthermore, analytical solutions for the other hypotheses cannot be
obtained. For example, consider the Loan treatment (Hypothesis 3a). Individuals pay part q ∈ [0, 1] of investment r for 1/q periods until the loan has
been repaid, maximizing utility:
= +
+ += +
EU p U W qr pU W L r qr
p U W qr pU W L r qr
max (1 ) [ ] [ (1 ) ( ) ]








(1 ) t 1 (C.6)
Taking the derivative of Eq. C.6 with respect to r leads to the first order condition:
= +
+ == +
F q p U W qr p L r q U W L r qr
p L r q U W L r qr
(1 ) [ ] ((1 ) ( ) ) [ (1 ) ( ) )]






(1 ) t 1 (C.7)
Abbreviate W qr1 as X1, W L r qr(1 ) ( )1 as X2 and W L r qr(1 ) ( )t as X3:
= + + +
+ += + = +
F p U X rq p U X pU X pr L r q U X
p U X pr L r q U X
(1 ) [ ] (1 ) [ ] [ ] ((1 ) ( ) ) [ ]






1 1 2 2
2
1
(1 ) 3 2
1
(1 ) 3t t1 1 (C.8)
It is not straightforward to determine the sign of Fq without restricting some of the parameters. Similar problems occur with Hypothesis 2a, 2b and
3b. Therefore, we decided to use numerical simulations to generate predictions about our hypotheses (see Appendix D).
Appendix D. Parameter calculations
To determine the parameters of our investment game, we calculated the net present value (NPV) based on Expected Utility (Eq. C.2) for different
combinations of parameters. Some parameters were chosen based on estimations from reality, such as the maximum damage (50,000 ECU) and the
interest rate (1%). For the effectiveness of damage reducing investments, we used the loss function =L r Ve( ) r proposed by Kelly and
Kleffner (2003), where V denotes the maximum loss and the effectiveness of mitigation is captured by parameter β. We aimed to base our loss
function on damage reduction estimates from real data: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) cost estimates and damage reduction
estimates for a typical single family dwelling of flood mitigation measures. Fig. D.1 plots these estimates16 against the loss function with different
values of β, with V = 200,000, the average value of this type of building. The mitigation function =L r Ve( ) r with 0.00001 ≤ β ≤ 0.00008 seems
to fit the data well.
We varied the parameters (savings account, income per round, probabilities, deductibles, β, number of installments) to find a reasonable
combination17 which allowed us to test all our hypotheses. Table D.1 shows the results of these simulations with our final set of parameters. The
table displays the NPV of Expected Utility of investments in damage mitigation over 10 rounds18, discounted by = 0.01 for different degrees of risk
aversion θ and normalized over the minimal and maximal possible expected values in the game. We used a power utility function of the form
=u x x( ) . The results are shown in comparison to zero investment. Therefore, all positive numbers are displayed in bold, as they indicate a net gain
from investing a positive amount. For each combination of treatment and scenario, the largest positive number gives the optimal investment
(underlined) for an individual. If no number is underlined the optimal investment is zero. Table D.2 shows the results for high discounting, = 0.1.
The following section repeats the hypotheses and explains briefly how each hypothesis can be tested based on the predictions in Table D.1 and
Table D.2.
Hypothesis 1. Damage reduction investments in the Insurance Baseline treatment are lower than in the No Insurance treatment, but greater than zero. The
16 Table 2.10, Table 2.13 and Table 2.18 from Aerts, Botzen, de Moel, and Bowman (2013) to be precise.
17 For example: 0.00001 ≤ β ≤ 0.00008, positive income.
18 Note that the actual design uses a fixed number of 12 rounds, but participants are only informed that each scenario takes at least 10 rounds. The results of the
simulations for 12 rounds (not shown here in detail) are very similar to the tables reported here and the corresponding hypotheses are identical.
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NPV is higher for all investments in No Insurance (denoted as H − and L − in Table D.1) compared to investments in Insurance Baseline. In the high
probability scenarios, positive investments may be optimal with insurance, depending on the deductible level and attitude to risk. For example, for a
risk averse individual in scenario HH (Table D.1a) the optimal investment in Insurance Baseline is 5000 ECU, which leads to a positive NPV of 0.005
compared to no investment. This allows for evaluation of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2a. Damage reduction investments are higher in the Premium Discount treatment than in the Insurance Baseline treatment. Comparing the
Table D1
Normalized NPV of investment by scenario and treatment at = 0.01.
Risk averse ( = 0.3)
Insurance Baseline Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000
H - 0.025 0.103 0.163 0.195
HH 0.003 0.005 −0.016 −0.055 0.059 0.239 0.374 0.440 0.003 0.004 −0.015 −0.048 0.058 0.239 0.375 0.446
HL −0.001 −0.013 −0.046 −0.092 0.057 0.231 0.361 0.425 −0.001 −0.013 −0.042 −0.082 0.057 0.232 0.365 0.434
HxL −0.008 −0.046 −0.099 −0.159 0.054 0.219 0.342 0.401 −0.008 −0.043 −0.091 −0.143 0.054 0.221 0.349 0.416
L - 0.001 −0.001 −0.012 −0.028
LH −0.008 −0.045 −0.097 −0.154 0.001 −0.003 −0.026 −0.063 −0.008 −0.043 −0.089 −0.139 0.002 0.000 −0.018 −0.049
LL −0.009 −0.048 −0.102 −0.160 0.001 −0.003 −0.026 −0.064 −0.009 −0.046 −0.094 −0.145 0.002 −0.001 −0.019 −0.049
LxL −0.010 −0.054 −0.111 −0.172 0.001 −0.004 −0.028 −0.066 −0.010 −0.051 −0.103 −0.156 0.002 −0.001 −0.019 −0.049
(b) Risk neutral ( = 1)
Insurance Baseline Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000
H - 0.025 0.103 0.163 0.195
HH 0.001 −0.003 −0.024 −0.057 0.052 0.216 0.341 0.406 0.002 −0.001 −0.020 −0.052 0.053 0.218 0.345 0.412
HL −0.002 −0.017 −0.047 −0.086 0.052 0.216 0.341 0.406 −0.002 −0.015 −0.043 −0.081 0.053 0.218 0.345 0.412
HxL −0.008 −0.044 −0.093 −0.144 0.052 0.216 0.341 0.406 −0.008 −0.042 −0.089 −0.139 0.053 0.218 0.345 0.412
L - 0.001 −0.001 −0.012 −0.028
LH −0.009 −0.047 −0.097 −0.150 0.001 −0.003 −0.024 −0.057 −0.009 −0.045 −0.093 −0.144 0.002 −0.001 −0.020 −0.052
LL −0.010 −0.050 −0.102 −0.156 0.001 −0.003 −0.024 −0.057 −0.009 −0.048 −0.098 −0.150 0.002 −0.001 −0.020 −0.052
LxL −0.011 −0.055 −0.111 −0.168 0.001 −0.003 −0.024 −0.057 −0.011 −0.053 −0.107 −0.162 0.002 −0.001 −0.020 −0.052
Risk seeking ( = 3)
Insurance Baseline Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000
H - 0.025 0.103 0.163 0.195
HH −0.002 −0.014 −0.029 −0.046 0.029 0.123 0.202 0.249 −0.001 −0.008 −0.022 −0.042 0.030 0.129 0.209 0.253
HL −0.003 −0.018 −0.037 −0.055 0.031 0.134 0.220 0.272 −0.002 −0.013 −0.033 −0.057 0.033 0.138 0.224 0.270
HxL −0.006 −0.030 −0.058 −0.083 0.036 0.155 0.255 0.316 −0.006 −0.030 −0.062 −0.096 0.037 0.156 0.251 0.303
L - 0.001 −0.001 −0.012 −0.028
LH −0.008 −0.039 −0.075 −0.107 0.000 −0.003 −0.015 −0.031 −0.008 −0.039 −0.079 −0.121 0.001 −0.003 −0.020 −0.046
LL −0.008 −0.041 −0.077 −0.110 0.001 −0.002 −0.013 −0.029 −0.008 −0.041 −0.083 −0.125 0.001 −0.002 −0.019 −0.045
LxL −0.009 −0.044 −0.084 −0.118 0.001 0.000 −0.011 −0.026 −0.009 −0.045 −0.090 −0.136 0.001 −0.001 −0.017 −0.044
Fig. D1. Parameter estimation of the mitigation function.
J.M. Mol, et al. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101500
16
Premium Discount column with the Insurance Baseline column gives higher NPV values in each of the rows and sub−tables in Table D.1. Therefore,
this hypothesis can be tested under all scenarios and risk attitudes.
Hypothesis 2b. Damage reduction investments are highest in the Loan+Discount treatment Under low time discounting (Table D.1), investments in the
Premium Discount treatment were already optimal, such that they stay optimal in Loan+Discount treatment. Under high time discounting
(Table D.2), Loan+Discount gives the highest optimal investments of all treatments in the low probability scenarios.
Hypothesis 3a. Damage reduction investments are lower for participants with high time discount rates. This effect is strongest in the Insurance Baseline and
Premium Discount treatments, but disappears in the Loan and Loan+Discount treatments. In the Insurance Baseline and Premium Discount treatments,
increasing the time discount rate from low time discounting ( = 0.01 in Table D.1) to high time discounting ( = 0.1 in Table D.2) decreases the
optimal investment level. No change is observed in the Loan and Loan+Discount treatments.
Hypothesis 3b. Risk-averse individuals will invest more in damage reduction in the Insurance Baseline treatment and the Loan treatment than risk-neutral
individuals, where risk-seeking individuals will invest less. In the Insurance Baseline and the Loan treatment, risk-neutral ( = 1, Table D.1a) individuals
will invest (scenario HH and HL). A risk-averse individual ( = 0.3, Table D.1 b) will also get a positive NPV for investing 5,000. Risk-seeking
individuals ( = 3, Table D.1 c) will not invest in any of these scenarios.
Appendix E. Comprehension questions
Correct answers are marked in bold.
E1. Questions asked in all treatments
• What was the flood risk in the test scenario?
a) 1% b) 3% c) 5% d) 10% e) 15% f) 20%
The answer depends on the risk in the test scenario (randomly determined).
• If you are flooded in year 1, what is the flood risk in year 2?
(a) Less than in year 1
Table D2
Normalized NPV of investment by scenario and treatment at = 0.1.
(a) Risk averse ( = 0.3)
Insurance Baseline Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000
H - 0.016 0.065 0.099 0.113
HH −0.001 −0.015 −0.048 −0.095 0.037 0.150 0.226 0.253 0.002 0.003 −0.011 −0.034 0.041 0.167 0.262 0.312
HL −0.004 −0.027 −0.069 −0.121 0.036 0.145 0.218 0.244 −0.001 −0.009 −0.030 −0.057 0.040 0.162 0.256 0.304
HxL −0.009 −0.050 −0.106 −0.168 0.034 0.137 0.206 0.230 −0.006 −0.030 −0.064 −0.101 0.038 0.156 0.246 0.293
L - −0.001 −0.009 −0.024 −0.044
LH −0.009 −0.048 −0.102 −0.161 −0.002 −0.018 −0.052 −0.097 −0.006 −0.030 −0.063 −0.098 0.001 0.000 −0.013 −0.034
LL −0.010 −0.051 −0.106 −0.166 −0.002 −0.019 −0.052 −0.097 −0.006 −0.032 −0.066 −0.102 0.001 0.000 −0.013 −0.035
LxL −0.011 −0.055 −0.113 −0.174 −0.002 −0.019 −0.053 −0.098 −0.007 −0.036 −0.073 −0.110 0.001 −0.001 −0.014 −0.035
(b) Risk neutral ( = 1)
Insurance Baseline Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000
H - 0.016 0.065 0.099 0.113
HH −0.003 −0.019 −0.051 −0.092 0.033 0.135 0.207 0.236 0.001 −0.001 −0.014 −0.036 0.037 0.154 0.244 0.291
HL −0.005 −0.029 −0.067 −0.112 0.033 0.135 0.207 0.236 −0.001 −0.010 −0.031 −0.057 0.037 0.154 0.244 0.291
HxL −0.009 −0.048 −0.099 −0.153 0.033 0.135 0.207 0.236 −0.006 −0.030 −0.063 −0.098 0.037 0.154 0.244 0.291
L - −0.001 −0.009 −0.024 −0.044
LH −0.010 −0.050 −0.103 −0.157 −0.003 −0.019 −0.051 −0.092 −0.006 −0.032 −0.066 −0.102 0.001 −0.001 −0.014 −0.036
LL −0.010 −0.052 −0.106 −0.161 −0.003 −0.019 −0.051 −0.092 −0.007 −0.034 −0.069 −0.106 0.001 −0.001 −0.014 −0.036
LxL −0.011 −0.056 −0.112 −0.169 −0.003 −0.019 −0.051 −0.092 −0.007 −0.038 −0.076 −0.114 0.001 −0.001 −0.014 −0.036
(c) Risk seeking ( = 3)
Insurance Baseline Premium Discount Loan Loan+Discount
1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000 1000 5,000 10,000 15,000
H - 0.016 0.065 0.099 0.113
HH -0.004 −0.021 −0.042 −0.062 0.019 0.078 0.125 0.149 0.001 −0.005 −0.016 −0.031 0.022 0.094 0.152 0.184
HL −0.005 −0.024 −0.047 −0.069 0.020 0.085 0.136 0.163 −0.002 −0.010 −0.024 −0.041 0.024 0.100 0.162 0.195
HxL −0.007 −0.033 −0.063 −0.089 0.023 0.098 0.158 0.190 −0.004 −0.021 −0.044 −0.068 0.026 0.111 0.179 0.215
L - −0.001 −0.009 −0.024 −0.044
LH −0.009 −0.042 −0.079 −0.111 −0.003 −0.016 −0.037 −0.059 −0.005 −0.028 −0.056 −0.086 0.001 −0.002 −0.014 −0.032
LL −0.009 −0.043 −0.080 −0.114 −0.002 −0.015 −0.035 −0.057 −0.006 −0.029 −0.059 −0.089 0.001 −0.001 −0.013 −0.032
LxL −0.009 −0.045 −0.085 −0.119 −0.002 −0.014 −0.034 −0.055 −0.006 −0.032 −0.064 −0.096 0.001 −0.001 −0.012 −0.031
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Table F1
Random-effects ML panel regressions for log-transformed investments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Qualitative List gain List loss BRET Combined
Treatment (ref. Baseline Insurance)
Premium Discount 1.886*** 1.927*** 1.909*** 1.892*** 1.916***
(0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.248)
Loan 0.137 0.139 0.115 0.048 0.099
(0.235) (0.235) (0.236) (0.235) (0.234)
Loan × Discount −0.217 −0.302 −0.243 −0.228 −0.285
(0.368) (0.369) (0.369) (0.367) (0.367)
Probability (ref. L: 3%)
H: 15% 1.656*** 1.639*** 1.623*** 1.640*** 1.649***
(0.391) (0.392) (0.392) (0.390) (0.390)
Deductible (ref. xL: 5%)
L: 15% 0.708*** 0.708*** 0.708*** 0.708*** 0.708***
(0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.209) (0.209)
H: 20% 1.223*** 1.223*** 1.223*** 1.223*** 1.223***
(0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.209) (0.209)
Order of scenario −0.492*** −0.494*** −0.497*** −0.494*** −0.493***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Participant flooded −0.024 −0.024 −0.024 −0.024 −0.024
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Neighbor flooded 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Decision time round 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk averse self reported 0.145***
(0.046)
Risk averse in gain domain 0.062**
(0.030)
Risk averse in loss domain −0.007
(0.036)




Constant 2.785*** 3.084*** 3.541*** 2.856*** 1.928**
(0.867) (0.P61) (0.894) (0.855) (0.932)
σu 3.421*** 3.426*** 3.431*** 3.417*** 3.416***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
σe 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.972***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 19,440 19,440 19,440 19,440 19,440
Nr of subjects 270 270 270 270 270
AIC 62,249 62,255 62,259 62,246 62,245
Log likelihood −31,097 −31,099 −31,101 −31,095 −31,094
Notes: Standard errors clustered by id and scenario in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Controls: Understanding questions, perceived difficulty,
flood risk perception, scenario-order × probability, high income, gender, age, efficacy, worry, regret and 1/round.
Fig. F1. Extra investments after first round.
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(b) Flood risk does not change
(c) More than in year 1
• How long are protective investments effective?
(a) From the moment you implement to the end of the experiment
(b) From the moment you implement to the end of the scenario
(c) From the start of the scenario to the end of the scenario
Extra question in the No Insurance treatment
• What happens if you are flooded and you did not take protective investments?
(a) I have to pay the full damage: 50.000 ECU
(b) I have to pay a small fee
(c) I will cry
E2. Extra question in all Insurance treatments
• What was your deductible (eigen risico) in the test scenario?
a) 5 percent b) 15 percent c) 20 percent d) 50 percent
The answer depends on the deductible in the test scenario (randomly determined).
Extra question in the Loan and Loan+Discount treatments
• Should you always repay your loan?
(a) No, I can refuse to pay the loan cost
(b) No, if the loan is not fully repaid in the last year, I am lucky
(c) Yes, I will pay the loan cost in the first 5 years
(d) Yes, if the loan is not fully repaid in the last year, I will pay the remainder
Extra question in the Premium Discount and Loan+Discount treatments
• What is the benefit of a protective investment?
(a) A reduced damage in case of a flood
(b) A lower premium
(c) Both reduced damage and a lower premium
(d) None of the above
Appendix F. Additional analyses
Risk aversion index
Our risk aversion index was a linear combination of the four risk aversion measures, following Menkhoff and Sakha (2017). Table F.1 shows the
results of our random-effects ML panel regressions for each of the four measures separately, in comparison to the combined measure (Model 5). All
risk aversion measures except the price list in the loss domain have positive and significant estimates.
Extra investors As investments in damage reduction lasted for all rounds of the game, it was optimal to invest in the first round. However, a
substantial number of subjects increased their existing investment after the first round, or started investing after the first round. The number of these
‘extra investors’ and the average extra investment, pooled by the appearance of each scenario, are plotted in Fig. F.1. The number of subjects that
invests extra drops by half from the first to the last scenario. Even though all subjects started with 5 rounds of the test scenario, a substantial number
of subjects invests extra in the experimental scenarios. Interestingly, extra investments are rather stable over the scenarios at about 7000 ECU.
To analyze the extra investors in more detail, we ran our random-effects ML panel regressions with log-transformed extra investments as the
dependent variable. This variable was constructed to capture a change in investment from the previous round, starting from round 2. For example, if
a subject invests 1000 ECU in round 1, nothing more in round 2 and increases to 5000 ECU in round 3, the extra investment variable takes the values
0, 0, 4000. Table F.2 shows that extra investments increase after a flood in the game that hit the subject’s house, but not after hitting the neighbors.
The non-significant estimates of probability and deductibles suggest that extra investments do not differ per scenario. In contrast to the analysis of
investments in all rounds, we find no effect of risk aversion and efficacy of protection on extra investments; these seem to be primary motivators to
invest at the start of the game. Extra investors seem to be primarily motivated by firsthand experience of flood in the game and anticipated regret.
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Supplementary material: experimental instructions
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101500 .
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